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TORTS - FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS Am: - PERTINENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL-
PROPRIETARY DISTINCTION-The tug Navajo went aground and its cargo was 
severely damaged by water. The owners and insurers of the tug and its 
cargo brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging that 
the grounding of the Navajo was caused by the failure of the light in the 
lighthouse on Chandeleur Island, and that this failure was attributable to 
negligent acts and omissions on the part of Coast Guard personnel whose 
duty it was to check the light. The district court dismissed the action on 
the ground that the United States had not consented to be sued in the 
manner in which this suit was brought, and the court of appeals affirmed.1 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari2 and affirmed per curiam;3 then, 
after granting a petition for rehearing,4 vacated its former judgment and 
held, reversed, four justices dissenting. The Federal Tort Claims Act can-
not be construed to provide that the United States has consented to be 
1 (5th Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 886. 
2 348 U.S. 810, 75 S.Ct. 60 (1954). 
8 349 U.S. 902, 75 S.Ct. 575 (1955). 
-¼ 349 U.S. 926, 75 S.Ct. 769 (1955). 
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sued only when it is engaged in a type of activity that private persons per-
form. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S. Ct. 122 (1955). 
The Federal Tort Claims Act was enacted to _waive federal tort im-
munity and alleviate the burden of private relief ·bills imposed on Con-
gress.5 Judicial interpretation has so limited the ·act, however, that recent 
writers have lamented its conversion into a motor vehicle accident law.6 
The decision in the principal case suggests a trend toward a more liberal 
construction of the entire statute. The act provides that the United States 
shall be suable for torts committed by its agents "to same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances,"1 subject to certain exceptions.8 It 
was argued in the principal case that since private persons do not operate 
lighthouses a private person could never be liable in these circumstances; 
consequently, the United States could not be liable. The Court's inter-
pretation of the clause-that "like circumstances" does not mean "the same 
· circumstances"9-would seem to be sound statutory construction, yet there 
is a group of cases which support the argument rejected in the principal 
case. Feres v. United States10 held that servicemen could not sue for in-
juries incident to military service. In that case, the Court said that the 
reason for its decision was that no private person has power to "conscript 
. . . a private army," that ther~ is no "analogous" liability in the law of 
torts, and that the action brought was "novel and unprecedented.''11 
The present decision limits the Feres case to military situations, although 
one is left to wonder upon what ground the distinction rests. To add to 
the confusion the cases following the Feres case relied on the language 
quoted, not only in cases of military service,12 but in some instances ap-
plied it to injuries arising from other types of purely "governmental" 
activity. In Dalehite v. United States the Court decided that the federal 
government could not be sued· for injuries caused by negligent fire fighting, 
relying on the Feres decision and citing the precise language referred to 
above.13 It has also been held that there is no waiver of immunity for in-
juries to federal prisoners,14 or injuries arising from an erroneous flood 
forecast,15 since private persons do not operate prisons or disseminate flood 
5 See S. Hearing Before Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2690, 
76th- Cong., 3d sess., p. 5 (1940). 
6 See Gellhom and Lauer, "Federal Liability for Personal and Property Damage," 29 
N.Y. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 1325 at 1326 (1954). 
128 U.S.C. (1952) §§2674, 1346 (b). 
8 28 u.s.c. (1952) §2680. 
9 Principal case at 64. 
10 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153 (1950). 
11 Id. at 141-142. 
'12See Archer v. United States, (9th Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 548, cert. den. 348 U.S. 953, 
75 S.Ct. 441 (1955). But d. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. no, 75 S.Ct. 141 (1954). 
13 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956 (1953). See also Rayonier v. United States, (9th Cir. 1955) 
225 F. (2d) 642. 
14 Sigmon v. United States, (D.C. Va. 1953) no F. Supp. 906; Shew v. United States, 
(D.C. N.C. 1953) n6 F. Supp. 1. 
15 See National Mfg. Co. v. United States, (8th Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 263,. cert. den. 
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information. More often than not, however, the courts have refused to 
apply the reasoning of the Feres case except to injuries incident to military 
service. Thus, such acts as exploding a nuclear device,16 guarding a 
sunken vessel,17 protecting a parking lot by a military policeman,18 and 
operating an airport control tower,19 have been found to fall within the 
waiver, although in all these cases it was urged that private persons do not 
engage in these activities. In most of these cases the courts flatly refused 
to give weight to the reasoning of the Feres case.20 However, some courts 
have sought to distinguish the Feres case by finding identical private activ-
ity.21 Purely as a matter of construction, one court suggests, although in 
a different context, that the canon "expression of one thing is the exclusion 
of another" applies to that section which delineates the exceptions to the 
act, hence precluding any exceptions based on other sections.22 Clearly 
the Feres doctrine would not stand this test. The soundest suggestion put 
forth on the statutory construction problem is that the "private person" 
clause was meant to describe the kind of liability intended, and not to 
prescribe limits for the operation of the act.23 The legislative history of 
the act is inconclusive, but the scattered comments that are available sup-
port this suggestion.24 The policy issue lying at the heart of the construc-
tion problem presented by the principal case is whether or not the pro-
visions of the act incorporate a distinction between federal activities that 
are governmental and those that are proprietary in nature. At the muni-
cipal corporation level the state courts overwhelmingly hold that there is 
immunity from suit for functions of a governmental nature, whereas the 
municipality can be sued when it inflicts injuries while acting in a proprie-
tary capacity.25 Despite the adoption of a statute waiving sovereign im-
munity in New York,26 the courts of that state still distinguish between 
governmental and proprietary functions when a suit is brought for 
347 U.S. 967, 74 S.Ct. 778 (1954). But see Mid-Central Fish Co. v. United States, (D.C. 
Mo. 1953) 112 F.-supp. 792. 
:16 Bulloch v. United States, (D.C. Utah 1955) 133 F. Supp. 885. 
17 See Somerset Sea Food Co. v. United States, (4th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 631, a case 
with facts quite similar to those of the principal case. 
18 Cerri v. United States, (D.C. Cal. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 831. 
19 Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., (D.C. Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d) 62 . 
.20 E.g.: Cerri v. United States, note 18 supra; Somerset v. United States, note 17 supra . 
.21 See Air Transport Associates v. United States, (9th Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d) 467; 
Bulloch v. United States, note 16 supra. 
.2.2 Wojciuk v. United States, (D.C. Wis. 1947) 74 F. Supp. 914 . 
.23 See Gilroy v. United States, (D.C. D.C. 1953) 112 F. Supp. 664; Pennsylvania R. Co. 
v. United States, (D.C. N.J. 1954) 124 F. Supp. 52 . 
.24 S. Hearing Before Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2690, 76th 
Cong., 3d sess., pp. 34, 37, 44 (1940); H. Hearing Before Committee on the Judiciary on 
H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 31, 32, 33, 61 (1942). For a general 
summary of the legislative history of the act, see Dalehite v. United States, note 13 supra. 
25 See Smith, "Municipal Tort Liability," 48 MICH. L. R.Ev. 41 (1949). 
26 Court of Claims Act, N.Y. Laws (1939) c. 860, §8. 
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negligent failure to act,27 although these courts have recognized that the 
waiver statute abolishes the old distinction for positive acts of negligence.28 
The language used in the principal case to reject the distinction at the 
federal level indicates that no provision of the act should be construed to 
include it. Viewed in this light, the case indicates an attitude on the part 
of the Court to give a broader interpretation to the act generally. 
David L.. Nelson 
21 Murrain v. Wilson Line, 270 App. Div. 372 at 377, 59 N.Y.S. (2d) 750 (1946), affd. 
296 N.Y. 845, 72 N.E. (2d) 29 (1947); Lloyd, "Municipal Tort Liability in New York-
Sequel," 24 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. REv. 38 (1949). But see Runkel v. City of New York, 282 
App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S. (2d) 485 (1953). 
28Bernadine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E. (2d) 604 (1945). 
